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Put Yourself in an EmergencyHow Will You Be Judged?
By OSBOF.E M.

REYNOLDS, JR.*

In applying the standard of due care in negligence cases,
courts have long recognized that one's actions in an emergency
situation are to be judged by a somewhat modified rule. Professor
James writes that the rule "will be applied even where the actor
has put himself in the emergency because of some prior negligence.... ."' Dean Prosser similarly indicates that an emergency
created by an actor may be considered in judging that actor's
subsequent conduct.2 A look at the cases reveals, however, that
the courts generally have neither stated nor applied the emergency
rule in this way, though it may be suggested that in the majority
of cases the James-Prosser formulation would not change the outcome. In those situations where the outcome might be affected,
however, their characterization seems less defensible than that
actually being used. Before considering the degree of acceptance
and desirability of the James-Prosser rule, it is necessary briefly
to consider the substance and application of the emergency
doctrine.
Nature of the Emergency Doctrine in Torts
The most accepted abstract statement of the emergency doctrine is that if a person, without negligence on his part, is confronted with a sudden emergency and lacks time to judge with
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.

iJames, Nature of Negligence, 3 UTAH L. Rv. 275, 288-89 (1953). The
author adds, "The exercise of due care in an emergency will not insulate an actor
from liability for the consequences of the negligence that helped to bring the
emergency about." Id. at 289.
2 W. PRossEn, LAw or TORTS 169-70 (4th ed. 1971).

Prosser qualifies this

assertion, however, by stating that "it obviously cannot serve to excuse the actor
when the emergency has been created through his own negligence, since he cannot
be permitted to shield himself behind a situation resulting from his own fault." Id.
at 170.
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certainty the best course to pursue, he cannot be held to the
same standard of care and accuracy of choice required in a situation where there was time for deliberation. 3 A typical example of
such emergency arises when the driver of a motor vehicle is confronted with the need to stop suddenly but finds that his brakes
will not hold properly.4 However, the necessary element of
"suddenness" will be missing if the driver had prior knowledge
of the poor condition of the brakes. 5 And the situation may be
determined not to have been an emergency at all, in the sense
of a true state of peril presenting limited, if any, means of escape
and demanding prompt decisions, unless all braking systems on
the vehicle have failed.6
Some cases have emphasized that the emergency rule's chief
application is in situations in which there is time only for instinctive action,' and it is clear that the presence of time for thought
3 Gibson Coal Co. v. Kriebs, 275 N.E.2d 821 (Ind.1971). The history of the
emergency doctrine is traced in Note, The Sudden Emergency Doctrine, 36 Miss.
L.J. 392 (1965).
It should be noted that in Texas an attempt has been made to distinguish
imminent peril (a doctrine used by a plaintiff to show defendant's negligent conduct
and defeat a charge of contributory negligence) from "emergency" (basically the
same as the doctrine in other states; can be used by defendant or by plaintiff to
show a peril created by a third party). The distinction is lttle recognized elsewhere and not clearly maintained-in the Texas cases. See Thode, Imminent Peril
and Emergency in Texas, 40 TExAs L. REv. 441 (1962).
Any emergency rule should be applicable only so long as the emergency lasts,
though occasionally it may be argued that the reasonable man would suffer some
after-effects. See Shank v. Baker, 333 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1964).
4 Daigle v. Prather, 380 P.2d 670 (Colo. 1963); Lengyel v. Hecht, 242 N.E.2d
135 (Ind. App. 1968) (golf cart); Swope v. Fallen, 413 S.W.2d 82 (Ky. 1967);
Minder v. Peterson, 93 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1958); Cohen v. Crimenti, 24 App. Div.
2d 587, 262 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965); Grier v. Cornelius, 148 S.E.2d 338 (S.C. 1966);
Cook v. Basnight, 151 S.E.2d 408 (Va. 1967). Cf. Spurlin v. Nardo, 114 S.E.2d
913 (W. Va. 1960) (brakes failed on steep hill; defendant panicked and jumped
from moving vehicle; emergency instruction proper). See generally Annot., 40
A.L.R.3d 9 (1971).
5 Houston v. Shreveport, 188 So.2d 923 (La. App. 1966). Cf. Hinkel v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 494 P.2d 1008 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (no "sudden emergency"
where6 driver entered area of fog and smoke after being warned of the conditions).
Fink v. East Mississippi Elec. Power Ass'n, 105 So.2d 548 (Miss. 1958);
Moore v. Taggart, 102 So.2d 333 (Miss. 1958); Ritchie v. Davidson, 158 N.W.2d
275 (Neb. 1968). But there may be a "sudden emergency" if brakes fail without
warning and there is no time to apply the emergency brakes. Cudney v. Moore,
428 P.2d 81 (Colo. 1967). Cf. Peters v. Rieck, 131 N.W.2d 529 (Iowa 1964).
Some cases state a general rule that there may be an emergency despite failure to
apply an emergency brake or take other evasive action. Cartey v. Smith, 125
S.E.2d 723 (Ga. App. 1962). Cf. Phillips v. Delta Motor Lines, Inc., 108 So.2d
409 (Miss. 1959) (brakes not in perfect working order).
7Whicher v. Phinney, 124 F.2d 929 (1st Cir. 1942). Cf. Tucker v. Blankenmeier, 315 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. 1958) (motorist slowed car suddenly and without
warning).
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and deliberation will usually render the rule inappropriate.'

But

it is also clear that the situation need not be one that reduced
the actor, or would have reduced the ordinary man, to a state of
panic, and there is authority that some degree of calm decision-

making does not necessarily eliminate the use of the doctrine.'
It can apply only where one party is alleging that another, after
being confronted with peril, failed to take a reasonable course of
conduct, and has no application to the situation in which the
accused party's conduct has simply brought on some emergency,

which would encompass practically all negligence cases.10 Perhaps
the least debatable uses of the rule have occurred in cases where
a driver is unexpectedly faced with an animal or object in the

road and reasonably makes some attempt to avoid it."
What then is the procedural use and effect of the emergency
doctrine? Though the alleged presence of an emergency is some-

times treated as an affirmative defense, 12 it is generally agreed
that it really is tantamount to a refutation of negligence and
should be allowed under a general denial. 13 Courts are not in
agreement as to whether the presence of an emergency constitutes
a complete defense to the charge of negligence or is merely one
factor to be weighed by the trier of fact in judging the actor's
conduct. Dean Prosser indicates that application of the doctrine

changes the standard by which the actor's conduct is to be
8 See Cook v. Thomas, 131 N.W.2d 299 (Wis. 1964), where the court indicated that five seconds for thinking was sufficient to prevent the situation from
being characterized as an emergency. The court also found, however, that the
evidence would support a finding of negligence even if an emergency were considered to exist.
9 Triestam v. Way, 281 N.W. 420 (Mich. 1938) (actor himself testified he
had made perfectly calm decision).
10 Thus there should be no emergency instruction unless it is alleged there
was negligence after the crisis arose. Daugherty v. May Bros., 121 N.W.2d 594
(Minn. 1963).
"1King v. Vico Ins. Co., 182 So.2d 135 (La. App. 1966), writ refused, 185
So.2d 220 (La. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841 (1966), reh. den., 385 U.S. 983
(1966) (sudden stop to avoid striking dog). See generally on liability for accidents
caused by trying to avoid animal in road, Annot., 41 A.L.R.31 1124 (1972).
See also Davis v. Cline, 493 P.2d 362 (Colo. 1972) (emergency instruction proper
where plaintiff considered himself forced to turn sharply to avoid collision with
car that had been in "blind spot" behind him).
12 Note, Act of God, Sudden Emergency, Unavoidable Accident, 19 OXELA. L.
REv. 308 (1966).
'3 Id.; Note, Pleading: Unavoidable Accident, Act of God, Sudden Emergency,
9 OKLA. L. REv. 211 (1956) (sudden emergency must be affirmatively alleged and
proven in Oklahoma, but rule criticized). Cf. Sannes v. Olds, 458 P.2d 729 (Wyo.
1969) (existence of emergency is not affirmative defense but one factor to be
weighed).
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measured, 14 and there is authority for the proposition that an
automobile driver faced with a sudden crisis is liable only if he
fails to make an honest exercise of judgment, but not liable for
nustakes."' 5 Undoubtedly there are situations where the presence
of great peril is so overwhelming that little or no judgment can
be expected, 16 and a directed verdict for the defendant is clearly
justified, even if hindsight shows that his actions were quite
unwise.'7 The language in most such cases that the emergency
excuses the conduct must thus be taken as saying there is, often
as a matter of law, simply no showing of negligence under the
particular, usually extreme, facts.
When pressed on the matter, the vast majority of courts agree
that the emergency doctrine is not normally a defense but rather
a rule of law stating that the presence of an emergency is one
factor to be considered in judging an actor's conduct. 8 Thus, the
doctrine is not an exception to the reasonable man standard but
an application of it; it declares, and emphasizes, that the legal
standard is reasonable conduct under the circumstances, and an
emergency is one such circumstance. 19 The significance of the
rule is chiefly that the jury may be instructed on its application in
addition to the instruction on negligence.20 This serves to spot14 W. PaossER, LAw OF TORTS 168-69 (4th ed. 1971). "The courts have been
compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not
to be held to the standard of conduct normally applied to one who is in no such
situation ..
" Id. See Casey v. Siciliano, 165 A. 1 (Pa. 1933), where the court
speaks approvingly of an instruction that in an emergency one is held only to the
exercise of his best judgment under the circumstances.
15 Polonofsky v. Dobrosky, 169 A. 93 (Pa. 1933). Cf. Houston v. Shreveport,
188 So.2d 923 (La. App. 1966), where the emergency doctrine was found
inapplicable but was referred to as a "defense."
10 Massie v. Barker, 113 N.E. 199 (Mass. 1916), where the court states that
the law does not require supernatural poise or self-control. Accord, Burhans v.
Burhans, 150 A. 795 (Md. 1930).
17 Kopp v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 257 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 19531
(uncontradicted evidence showed that sudden stop was necessary to avoid
hitting child who darted into road). Similar cases are those in which an actor
must choose between a course of conduct that may bring injury to others and one
that may cause him harm; it has been found not necessarily negligent to prefer
oneself. Thurmond v. Pepper, 119 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). Cf. Noll
v. Marian, 32 A.2d 18 (Pa. 1943), noted 18 TEmP. L.Q. 290 (1944) (tellers
attempts during a bank robbery to save himself and his employer's property increased danger to customers in the bank).
IsLuper Transp. Co. v. Barnes, 170 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1948); Jones v.
Hughey, 283 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. 1955). See James, Nature of Negligence, 3 UTAH
L. 1Ev. 275, 288-89 (1953).
'9 Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gusewelle, 190 F.2d 248 (8th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied,
20 342 U.S. 866 (1951).
Stump v. Fitzgerald, 484 P.2d 1056 (Ariz. App. 1971).
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light the possible relevance of the alleged emergency for the jury.
Therefore, the grant or denial of such an instruction 2' has become
a fertile breeding ground for appeals. The ultimate decision on
the issue of negligence, here as elsewhere, is normally for the
jury.22 The emergency instruction is merely informational and

cautionary and does not bind the trier of fact to any particular
conclusion.2 3 Such an instruction has been appropriately described as "only an elaboration of the basic principle, though
possibly a significant one because of the potential impact on the
jury of calling this point to their attention."2 4
Relevance of Actor's Conduct Priorto Emergency
Where the actor himself creates the emergency, the question
becomes whether he is entitled to an instruction that his conduct
be judged in light of the emergency. Clearly, the emergency
cannot excuse the actor's prior conduct that created the peril.25
It is not one of the circumstances under which he acted at that
time. Similarly, if the actor's conduct presents a continuing danger, that danger cannot justify the actor's subsequent conduct.2 6

But what if the emergency is created by trying to pass another
21 See the limitations imposed on the giving of such an instruction in Menge
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 164 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1969): the court said that the
instruction is proper only if the one seeking its benefits is free from negligence
contributing to the emergency, if the time element was so short as to preclude
deliberate and intelligent choice of actions, and if the alleged negligence concerns
questions of management and control. Similar problems arise where instructions
attempt to deal with physical handicaps of parties. See Otterbeck v. Lamb, 456
P.2d 855 (Nev. 1969) (holding that a deaf mute has no higher duty than the
person of unimpaired faculties). But of. Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen, 338 P.2d
743 (Wash. 1959) (holding it proper to refuse an instruction that defendant-city
was under no higher duty of care to a blind person than to a person with normal
vision2 2).

Thus, in Guanzon v. Kalamau, 402 P.2d 289 (Hawaii 1965), it was held
that the jury should decide whether, following brake failure, the driver was
negligent in his operation of the car. Accord, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Ricks,
376 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1964).

23 Cf. Pokora v. Wabash fy., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), which held that it was not
necessarily negligence to fail to get out of a vehicle before crossing railroad tracks,
stating that, "[iin default of the guide of customary conduct, what is suitable for
the traveler caught in a mesh where the ordinary safeguards fail him is for the
judgment of a jury." Id. at 106. See generally 0. HoLNms, TE CO.MON LAW
110-11 (1881).

24 p. KEETON
25
26

& R.

KEETON, INsTnUcTOr's NoTEs FOR TORTS

24 (1972).

James, Nature of Negligence, 3 UTAH L. REv. 275, 289 (1953).
This was the situation in Prunty v. Vandenberg, 44 N.W.2d 246 (Wis.
1950), where defendant, in addition to traveling 200 feet without attempting
to apply his emergency brake after discovering that his footbrake wouldn't work,
failed to see plaintiff's vehicle and thus made no attempt to avoid a collision.
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car when there is too little time to do so, and the situation thus
posed presents several alternatives, such as speeding up, jamming
on the brakes, or driving off the road? In making a selection, is
the actor who himself brought on the peril entitled to have the
emergency considered in judging his subsequent conduct?
Most cases have held that an emergency instruction is im27
proper where it favors the one who created the emergency.
The relatively few cases that elaborate on their reasoning indicate
that one who has negligently placed himself in a position that
allows only instinctive or hasty action subsequent to becoming
aware of the danger is not entitled to have any advantage or consideration given him due to this self-created dilemma. 28 Thus, if
a driver negligently goes off the right side of the road when being
passed on the left, and loses control of the car when he tries to
guide it back onto the road, he is not entitled to an emergency
instruction. 29 Nor is one who attempts to drive another car off
the road entitled to such an instruction when he succeeds in
causing an accident.30
Dean Prosser cites an old Missouri case 8 ' in support of the
27 Cano v. Neill, 473 P.2d 487 (Ariz. App. 1970); Terry v. Fagan, 166 S.E.2d
254 (Va. 1969); Jacobs v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp 165 N.W.2d
162 (Wis. 1969) (holding as matter of law that negligence caused emergency).
Cf. Casey v. Siciliano, 165 A. 1 (Pa. 1933) (approving instructions that included
the emergency rule but clearly told the jury to find for plaintiff if defendant was
negligent in creating the emergency). See generally Note, The Sudden Emergency
Doctrine, 36 Miss. L.J. 392, 398-99 (1965) listing various acts and omissions that
have been found to preclude resort to the doctrine. See also 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles
28 and Highway Traffie § 360 (1963).
Whicher v. Phinney, 124 F.2d 929 (1st Cir. 1942). Cf. Gambino v. Lubel,
190 So.2d 152 (La. App. 1966) (diabetic defendant continued to drive after the
onset of an insulin reaction).
29 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 428 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. 1968). See generally Evans,
The Standard of Care in Emergencies, 31 Ky. L.J. 207, 219-20 (1943), which
discusses some older cases in which an emergency instruction was refused because
the party had contributed to the emergency, though he made the best possible
choice
3 once the emergency arose.
0 Vaughn v. Baxter, 488 P.2d 1234 (Okla. 1971). The tort committed in this
case was clearly an intentional one, and on this basis the court held that the use of
contributory negligence and other negligence-action defenses was inappropriate.
Further, the court stated that the use of the emergency doctrine as a aefense is
" Id. at 1237.
not available to one whose tortious acts create the emergency ..
It would seem the emergency instruction, like the contributory negligence defense,
is not really appropriate in intentional tort actions. Defenses such as self-defense
are, of course, available and the rationale for allowing the self-defense privilege
where there is a reasonable even if mistaken, belief in the need for it is much the
same as the rationale behind the emergency instruction: careful deliberation cannot
be demanded in times of peril.
31 Windsor v. McKee, 22 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1929).

KNzTucKY

LAw JouRNA[

[Vol. 62.

statement that it is "not the conduct after the emergency has
arisen which is not excused, but the prior negligence."32 While
the case does clearly indicate that the prior negligence which
creates the emergency is not excused, it does not make plain
whether subsequent conduct may be justified by the emergency.
Plaintiff, whose contributory negligence was in question, had
continued to drive despite a bad dust storm; the court noted
and approved instructions stating that if he had thus brought
peril on himself, he was not entitled to be excused for the emergency-creating negligence. It is true that the court approved an
instruction stating that if the driver was subsequently in peril of
being struck by another car, he could drive to a place in the
highway where he would escape injury and would not be liable
for such action if he exercised "ordinary care." But the approved
instruction did not contain any reference to ordinary care under
the circumstances of an emergency. The overall effect of the
stated instructions seems to deny the benefit of the emergency
doctrine to the creator of the peril, and this appears to be the
33
present Missouri law.

Even a mechanical failure such as the bursting of a brake line
does not necessarily allow an actor to utilize the emergency
doctrine, since he may have negligently created the emergency
34
by acting unreasonably after he had knowledge of the defect.

It seems clear that an actor may be denied benefit of the rule even
PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 170 (4th ed. 1971).
See Jones v. Hughey, 288 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. 1955), which held that the
emergency doctrine has no application where the emergency arises wholly or
partially from the negligence of the one seeking to invoke the rule.
A plaintiff barred from use of the emergency doctrine and found negligent in
creating the emergency may nonetheless sometimes recover under last clear chance.
Norwood Trans p. Co. v. Bickell, 92 So. 464 (Ala. 1922) (called "doctrine of
subsequent negligence"); Spoeneman v. Uhri, 60 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1933) (called
"humanitarian rule"). Indeed, a plaintiff who may have been contributorily negligent in bringing on a perilous situation may often do well to argue last clear chance
rather than try to obtain the application of the emergency doctrine since the
doctrine's successful invocation often requires the person confronted with the
emergency to be free from negligence.' See text accompanying note 3 supra. On the
relation between last clear chance and the emergency doctrine, see generally Evans,
The Standard of Care in Emergencies, 31 Ky.L.J. 207, 212, 214 (1948).
3
4 Augello v. Call, 210 So.2d 129 (La. App. 1968) (defendant had experienced
prior brake trouble; failed to apply brakes until he was 2 car-lengths from
laintiff's stopped vehicle). See alo Allen v.Schultz 181 P. 916 (Wash. 1919)
emergency rule held unavailable to one who was negligent in failing to anticipate
at a streetcar would stop at its usual stopping place and in driving a car with
defective brakes).
32 W.

83
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though he was not the sole cause of the peril. Thus if a driver
confronted by a dog in his car's path has contributed, for example,
by driving too fast, to the emergency thereby presented, he may
be found negligent.2 5 Although a sudden emergency instruction
has often been held proper where a driver's brakes have failed
without warning,'( such instruction has been denied, or held
37
improper, where the actor drove with knowledge of the defect,
though some additional fault of the actor in such cases is often
found in his failure to apply the emergency brake38 or in driving
too fast.3 0 In Ohio, even the failure of brakes without warning

will never justify a sudden emergency instruction, the theory
being that the operator of any vehicle has a statutory duty to
maintain the brakes in good working condition at all times.40
The question of whether to give an emergency instruction
often arises where a party has helped bring on the peril by his
inattention. Again, the cases have consistently denied such actor
any use of the emergency theory. Thus, where a driver operating
his vehicle in heavy traffic focuses his attention for an unreasonable length of time on a pedestrian walking beside the road, he
is not entitled to the benefit of the emergency rule when he thereafter runs into the rear of another car. 4 ' Similarly, a pedestrian
who places himself in peril by walking back into the path of an
35
Sarnak v. Cehula, 142 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1958) (excessive speed could be
negligence even assuming driver was confronted with sudden emergency). Cf.
Sturdavant v. Covington, 277 P.2d 814 (Utah 1954) (a finding of contributory
negligence held reasonable when the plaintiff created a situation where he would
have to make an emergency stop without a chance to signal). See also Flynn v.
Little, 141 N.E.2d 182 (Ohio L. Abs. 1957), where the court, applying Pennsylvania law, held that an emergency instruction should be qualified by saying that
the rule is used only if the emergency was not of the actor's making and only
if it does not appear that the actor was driving in a reckless or careless manner.
36 See cases cited note 4 supra. But see cases cited note 6 supra, indicating
that there is no emergency unless all braking systems fail. See also Giorgetti v.
Wollaston, 83 Cal. App. 358, 257 P. 109 (1st D. Ct. App. 1927), holding a defendant liable under last clear chance where he failed to avoid a collision by
applying both brakes and/or changing his course.
37 See Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1955).
38 Henthorn v. Long, 122 S.E.2d 186 (W. Va. 1961) (defendant was taking
truck to have brakes repaired).
39 Lee v. Zaske, 6 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1942).
40 Bird v. Hart, 205 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio 1965) (emphasizing driver's control of
car); Spalding v. Waxler, 205 N.E.2d 890 (Ohio 1965) (emphasizing violation of
statutes). Cf. Stump v. Phillians, 207 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1965) (sudden brake
failure no excuse for driving into plaintiff).
41 See Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1959), noting that it is well
settled that a defendant is not entitled to the benefit of an emergency charge if his
own action contributed to the emergency.
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oncoming car, when another step forward would have brought
him to safety, cannot avail himself of the doctrine.-'
Effect of Differing Rules ConcerningActor's PriorNegligence
Considering the above discussion, it may be reasonably asked
whether the tendency to deny the emergency-creating actor the
benefit of the emergency rule is effectively any different from
the rule suggested by James and Prosser. In most cases, the
result will be the same. When a party's negligence-driving too
fast, for instance-has brought on an emergency, it is usually not
necessary to base liability on conduct subsequent to the appearance of the peril, such as not swerving to avoid the person or
object with which he collides. A chain of both actual and proximate causation may normally be found from the unreasonable
rate of speed, i.e., the emergency-creating conduct. Even assuming that the driver did all that was humanly possible to prevent
the collision once it appeared imminent (or even possible), his
prior negligence remains both cause-in-fact and cause-in-law of
the accident. It is thus immaterial whether the emergency
standard can be used to judge his subsequent conduct, since that
conduct is not the basis of liability; everyone agrees the peril
cannot be used to justify his prior conduct.
Occasionally, however, a superseding or intervening cause
might be found to interrupt the trail of proximate causation from
original negligence, such as driving too fast, to the accident.
The highly unexpected and unforeseeable actions of another
driver could constitute an intervening factor, as could an unforeseeable road condition or weather development. Indeed, such
occurrences might so substantially modify the situation that a
driver's original negligent conduct of driving too fast could no
longer be considered an actual cause, let alone a proximate one,
of the ultimate disaster. Then the only possibility of recovery
against the allegedly negligent actor would be a tort action based
on his conduct after the emergency had arisen, alleging negligent
choices of conduct and/or negligent methods of action. In such
instances, should the actor's conduct be judged in light of the
emergency? According to statements in the cases, it should not
42
Lindberg v. Goode, 108 S.E.2d 864 (Va. 1959). It seems this might have
been treated as a situation where, even conceding the presence of an emergency,
the pedestrian was himself negligent.

19'74]

EmiRGNCY

be if his negligence contributed even partially to the creation of
the emergency; some courts indicate that "fault" less than negligence might also deprive the actor of the benefit of the emergency
43
rule.
However, the standard for determining negligence is always
basically the same: reasonable care under the circumstances. All
courts which have seriously considered the matter have agreed
that the emergency doctrine is not an exception to this rule.

Therefore, the emergency, if truly present, should clearly be
considered, for if it is not, the actor's conduct is judged in a
vacuum, and some vague concept of "reasonable" or "ordinary"
44
care is applied without reference to the totality of the situation.

There seems no reason to depart from the general custom of
instructing the jury to consider all circumstances and to determine
whether an actor's conduct was reasonable in light of such facts.
Professor James' statement on the use of the emergency rule
in such cases is, however, broad enough to allow not only the use
of the customary negligence instruction, which refers to "all the

circumstances," but also of the instruction emphasizing the
existence of an emergency. It is submitted that the courts have
often reached a more workable compromise by denying the
negligent actor this benefit. Even assuming the proximate cause

test is not met by the actor's original emergency-creating conduct,
if his negligence contributed substantially to the situation of peril,

it would clearly give him the benefit of his own misconduct to
specifically call the jury's attention to the difficulty of decision
in the face of that peril. Where the actual causation test is not
met-that is, where the actor's conduct cannot in light of other
events be considered a substantial factor in producing the peril43 See Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1959); Terry v. Fagan, 166
S.E.2d 254 (Va. 1969). But, unless there is some reason for imposing a higher
duty on a party, it is doubtful that anyone should be deprived of the emergency
doctrine's benefit if his conduct does not violate the usual standard of reasonableness; it seems no other standard is legally relevant or accepted. Note, The Sudden
Emergency Doctrine in Florida, 21 U. Fr.A. L. Rq . 667, 673 (1969), discusses
whether the actor's conduct must be tortious or need only contribute to the peril
in
to preclude
an emergency
The author concludes that, at
leastorder
in Florida,
the conduct
probablyinstruction.
must he tortious.
44 See the vague reference to "'ordinarycare" in the instructions discussed in
Windsor v. McKee, 22 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1929). Cf. Flynn v. Little, 141
N.E.2d 182 (Ohio App. 1957), stating that a defendant should not be allowed
the emergency instruction if he drove in a "careless" manner. Such instructions
fail to bring home to the jurors that the standard must be reasonableness under the
circumstances. Compare, emphasizing the need to consider all circumstances, Levi
v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 496 P.2d 370 (Okla. 1972), with Windsor and Flynn.

KE
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it is much more difficult to deny giving an emergency instruction.
If the actor's fault is thus truly "fault in the air," it would seem
to be irrelevant.
Cases may be rare in which fault is cited without meeting the
substantial factor requirement. But if as a matter of law the
alleged negligence of the actor was not an actual cause of the
emergency, there seems no reason to deny the instruction which
emphasizes the perilous situation. Where the trier of fact must
evaluate conduct in an emergency which was brought on by the
actor himself, the courts have generally done a better job than
the writers in balancing the need for a comprehensible standard
with the desire to prevent the actor from benefitting from his
negligence. The general rule in these cases appears to deny a
specific instruction on emergency, but to give an instruction on
the normal negligence standard which includes a reference to all
surrounding events. The alternative, which is useful where a
jury question is presented on fault and/or actual causation, is to
give an emergency instruction but qualify it by warning the jury
to consider it only if it is determined that the actor did not cause
the peril.45 This instruction would be appropriate only where
there is a real possibility of finding no liability for the original
conduct that allegedly contributed to the peril, but finding
liability for conduct after the peril had occurred. Where the trier
of fact could reasonably so conclude, the plaintiff deserves the
same consideration he would receive if no question of his role in
creating the emergency were raised-an instruction specifically
calling attention to the emergency.
The rules on emergency instructions can then become definite:
(1) If as a matter of law the actor's prior conduct was not the
actual and proximate cause of emergency, give the emergency
instruction; (2) If as a matter of law the actor's prior conduct
contributed to the emergency, deny the instruction but allow
subsequent conduct to be judged "under all the circumstances";
(3) If there are jury questions as to whether the actor's conduct
created the emergency, give the instruction, but qualify it with
directions that it be used only if the questions are resolved
favorably to the actor.
45 See Casey v. Siciliano, 165 A. I (Pa. 1933).

